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The purpose of this thesis is to study empirically the 
issue of capital structure of listed firms in Hong Kong. 
Capital structure is a topic in corporate finance related 
to a firm's decision of how to choose between debt and 
equi ty to finance its investment. The outcome of the 
choice is reflected in a firm's debt ratio. 
This empirical research is divided into two parts 
which belong to two different schools' testable hypotheses 
respectively. The first part of the empirical study is to 
test the signs of various determinants on debt ratios of 
firms in Hong Kong and this can be grouped under the static 
tradeoff school. It is shown to be conststent wi th the 
re suI ts of corresponding studies using foreign country 
data. However, like these studies, it also suffers from 
the problem of having only low explanatory power, ie, the 
regression has low R2. In view ot : this~ bthe~ sChools arise 
to provide different views on the capital structure 
problem. Among them, the most important are the agency 
costs school and the asymmetric information school. 
In this connection, another empirical study was 
conducted in order to see whether there exists a bet ter 
explanation of capi tal structure problem in Hong Kong. 
This second empirical study is concerned wi th a famous 
testable hypothesis under asymmetric information school -
the announcement effect. The announcement effect implies 
that when a firm announces equity issue, its stock price 
Hill drop significantly because :Lnvc..~ stors regard th(~ (~quLty 
issue as bad 11 e \oJ s . ~~ e find that Ho 11 gK 0 n 9 is consi s tent 
wit h w hat t. het h eo r y pr e die t s . Th ere i s a 5. '7?(t d r 0 pin t h P 
rate of return on announcement. The existence of th(~ 
announcement effect in Hong Kong can pa.rtial1y account fot' 
why firms in Hong Kong are reluctant to issue equity for 
financing purpose. Implici tly ( as suggested by the 
asymmetric information model, there does not exist an 
optimal. ca pi tal structure for a firm becaus(:~ the bes t 
strategy is to choose debt rather than equity. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The capital structure theory is a cornerstone of 
finance theory. It examines a firm's decision behaviour in 
choosing between debt and equity to finance its 
investments. The basic questions are whether there is any 
difference between issuing equi ty and debt as means of 
finance, and what factors are crucial in such decisions. d 
Starting from the famous Modigliani-Miller theorem l , 
numerous theorists put forward their analysis to enrich the 
literature. Briefly speaking, they can be grouped into 
three main streams: the static tradeoff school, the agency 
costs school and the asymmetric information school. In 
chapter two, a review of both the theoretical and empirical 
literature is presented to introduce the basic tenets of 
these various schools. 
The static tradeoff model staFes that there is an 
optimal debt ratio (debt/total asset) that maximizes the 
value of the firm. Since interest payments on debt is tax 
deductible - at the corporate level, it is beneficial for the 
firm to adopt debt financing. However, the increasing use 
of debts will give rise to bankruptcy risk. As a 
consequence, of balancing the benefits and costs of using 
1 The MM theorem states that a firm's value is independent 
of the method of financing. In other words, whether an investment 
is financed by debt or equity is irrelevant to the value of a 
firm. 
1 
debt, we can obtain an optimal debt ratio. 
Unfortunately, the empirical results of the static 
tradeoff model is unsatisfactory because of its low 
explanatory power. In other words, the static tradeoff 
model only captures a portion of the real situation. 
Owing to this deficiency, agency costs school explains 
that optimal debt ratio is the result of minimizing agency 
costs of debt and equity respectively. They claim that the 
agency costs problem arises due to conflict of interests 
between managers and shareholders as well as between 
shareholders and creditors. For the agency cost of equity, 
when the manager holds less than 100% ownership of the 
firm, he will not maximize the value of the firm which 
would be in the shareholders' interest because he needs not 
bear all the responsibili ty of his misbehaviour. The 
nature of the agency costs of debt is easily understood. 
It is due to limited liability on the part of the 
shareholders. When they are engaged in some investment 
activities with very low probabilitr of· s~ccess but with 
high payoffs in case of success, it is the creditors who 
bear most of the costs and risks but the shareholders who 
recei ve the main returns. The various costs associated 
with the activities which are due either to misbehaviour or 
protective measures can be referred as agency cost. 
On the other hand, the asymmetric information approach 
states that the distribution of information between the 
management and the market is uneven. The management knows 
the true situation of the firm while the market has only a 
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conditional expectation of such situation. The theory 
implies that a firm will try not to issue equity as far as 
possible because it would signal bad news to the investors. 
Moreover, a firm will first exhaust its internal funds and 
debt capacity before equity financing. Among many testable 
hypotheses, the most famous one of the asymmetric 
information model is the announcement effect which is 
tested in the second part of this empirical study. 
In this thesis, we will first fbllow the traditional 
approach (static tradeoff model) to test the signs of 
various determinants on the debt ratio in Hong Kong. A 
cross-section method across listed firms in Hong Kong is 
adopted and simple Ordinary Least Square estimation j.s 
used. The finance sector is dropped because of its 
inherent high debt ratio. The resul ts are acceptable 
because the signs of these estimated parameters are 
basically similar to what the theory predicts. 
Unfortunately, it is also subject to the same fate as faced 
by the corresponding studies using foreign country data, 
i.e. it has a low R2. The low accounting power shows that 
there must be other considerations besides tax-saving 
motive and ·bankruptcy costs in influencing the debt ratio. 
In view of this, ' since simply relying on the use of 
the static tradeoff model cannot account for the nature of 
the capital structure problem very effectively, the second 
part of this empirical study is conducted with the view to 
enrich our understanding of the capital structure in Hong 
Kong. The part 11 empirical study is concerned with the 
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test of announcement effect under the domain of the 
asymmetric information model. The reason for testing the 
announcement effect is that it is theoretically sound and 
is also empirically treatable. On the contrary, the agency 
costs approach can be best understood to give us another 
view of the problem rather than providing us wi th good 
testable hypothesis. The details of empirical results of 
different schools are explained in chapter two. The 
presence of announcement effect will lead to the drop of a 
firm's stock price once announcement is made because 
investors regard the news of announcement as a bad signal 
of the nature of the firm. Since the market reaction to 
the event of equity issue will be reflected promptly when 
the firm releases the news of issue rather than after the 
newly issued stocks are traded, it is therefore known as 
announcement effect. The details of the theoretical 
foundation can be found in the literature review in chapter 
two. 
The result of the part IT empi~ical study shows that 
: 
Hong Kong is a good case of testing announcement effect. 
The sample year is from 1984-1990. It is shown that there 
is an average "of 5.7% drop in the rate of return when firms 
announce equity issues. This effect implies that there 
does not exist any specific optimal leverage ratio (debt 
ratio) because, according to the theory, firms usually 
avoid equity issues. We try to make use of the result to 
describe the Hong Kong situation. For several equi ty 
issues, we examine its causes, timing, amount, debt ratios 
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in the year of issues, it is found that listed firms in 
Hong Kong try to avoid equity issues except in the year of 
a booming stock market because it can dilute the adverse 
effect on stock prices. Moreover, there are many special 
features related to equity issues. For instance, firms 
normally issue equi ty in the need of a large amount of 
fund, when the debt ratios are high. The need for huge sum 
of money means tha t the firms wi 11 suf f er heavy debt 
payment responsibility when they use debt financing. This 
provides an incentive for equity financing. Moreover, high 
debt ratios imply that firms cannot easily raise more debts 
for financing because of credit rationing set by banks in 
Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, the absence of a well developed 
bond market means that debt financing appears mainly in the 
form of bank loans rather than bonds. As a resul t, the 
credi t limi ts set by banks act as the upper limi t to a 
firm's debt ratio. These features are consistent with the 
pecking order theory and the test of announcement effect 
explains why firms usually choose to ~ssue only in the year 
of prosperous stock market. As a result, it can be said 
that Hong Kong is a good case to test the asymmetric 
informatiorr model. 
In short, the coexistence of two empirical resul ts 
shows tha t no school itself can completely explain the 
capital structure problem. The traditional tradeoff model 
only gives us a static picture of various determinants on 
the debt ratio in Hong Kong. It says how a firm's 
characteristics affect the debt ratio. However, it gives 
5 
us no further perspective of the problem. Perhaps, the 
asymmetric information model can give us a better outlook 
on the capital structure problem in Hong Kong. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW - THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
The literature review is divided into two parts: one 
is a theoretical review while the second part is an 
empirical review. 
I) THEORY REVIEW 
In 1958, Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller together 
put forward their famous Modigliani-Miller theorem or 
simply known as the M-M theorem [45] to explain the capital 
structure phenomenon. In brief, the M-M theorem states 
that the cost of capita1 2 is independent of financial 
decision, i.e. regardless of whether the investment 
decision is financed either by debt or equity. In fact, 
this means that the value of a firm is independent of its 
financial structure and the debt ratio(debt/t.asset) 
therefore cannot be determined. 
In 1963, they further enriched their analysis by 
incorporating corporate tax rate into the model [46]. 
Since interest payment on debt is tax deductible in the 
USA, by the spirit of ' this paper, it implies that all debt 
financing is the most preferable and therefore is the best 
funding decision. 
2 The required rate of return on a firm's new investments. 
It is the minimum rate of return that the firm should expect to 
earn on its new investments. 
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However, this implication is obviously incompatible 
with empirical evidence. 
are financed with the 
In our world, nearly all firms 
mix of debt and equi ty In the 
presence of the tax system. In view of this, many models 
are set up to explain the phenomenon. Basically, these 
theories can be divided into three approaches: they are the 
static tradeoff approach, the agency cost approach and the 
asymmetric information approach. In this literature 
review~ based on many classical or crucial ' papers, we will 
examine them one by one. 
A} The static tradeoff model 
As mentioned above, after introducing corporate tax 
rate into the M-M theorem, their model implies all debt-
financing investment decision. Nevertheless, this is 
inconsistent with our observations. 
Afterwards, one main stream of approach is to stress 
that there are related costs like bankruptcy costs [36] to 
, I 
counterbalance the benefits of interest payment 
deductibility,. Consequently, is it possible to derive an 
optimal capital structure after optimizing the costs and 
benefits of debt finartcing? This class of analysis can be 
grouped under the domain of the static tradeoff model. The 
introduction of the static tradeoff model will be presented 
starting from the M-M theorem. 
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A.l) M-M theorem and its extension. 
In this section, we will briefly introduce original M-
M theorem and its extension. The proof was supplied by 
Modigliani and Miller - the pioneers [45]. 
A.l.l) Assumptions: 
Perhaps, there are two major assumptions underlying 
the M-M theorem; 
1) Perfect capital market and all debts areriskless; 
2) Use of perpetual cash flo'w3 for illustration; 
3) The firm maximizes the value of the firm4. 
4) Existence of risk classes5. 
3 Cash flow is different from operating income because a 
portion of total fixed costs are noncash expenses such as 
depreciation and deferred taxes. Roughly speaking, the use of 
cash flow captures the concept of payments/returns to 
shareholders and credi tors for consumption because it is the 
actual resources that shareholders and creditors get. Therefore, 
the appropriate concept for managers to use when making decisions 
are the discounted stream of cash flows. 
4 Normally, the definition of the value of a firm is the sum 
of discounted future cash flow to its stocks as well as to its 
debts. Sometimes, maximizing the value of; the firm is regarded 
as maximizing the welfare of the shareholders because the payment 
to debtholders is fixed. The larger is the value of a firm, the 
more is left to the shareholders after paying to the creditors. 
5 One of the most distinguished feature of their proof of 
the theorem is -based on the risk class assumption. They say 
"firms can be divided into 'equivalent return' classes such that 
the return on the shares issued by any firm in any given class 
is proportional to (and hence perfectly correlated with) the 
return on two shares issued by other firm in the same class" [ 
41 pp.226] . The implication is that the expected risky future 
net operating cash flows vary only by a scalar factor. The proof 
is shown as follows: 
Proof: [ 12 ] 
Let CF· =~CF· where i,j stands for different firms. 
CF = tfie risky net cash flow from operation before interest 
and taxes. 
~ = a scalar factor. 
We define Nit = (CFit - CFit -1) /CF it -1 as the return for firm i, 
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A.l.2) The M-M theorem - their proof: [45] 
Within the same class, the expected returns are the 
same for all firms. 
Notations: 
1) X - the expected return on the asset; 
2) S - the market value of its common shares; 
3) D - the market value of the debts of the company; 
4) V=S+D - the market value of the firm (if the firm 
has no debt, therefore V=S); 
5) r - interest rate; 
6) Y - returns to the investors. 
Now, suppose firm values are different across firms 
within the same risky class. 
Suppose there are two firms wi thin the same risky 
class, the first firm is composed of equity only while the 
second firm consists of both debts and equity. Let the 
value of the second firm is greater than the value of the 
fir s t firm, i. e. V 2 > VI: 
For an investor holding SI) dollars 1 . worth of the shares 
6 ' 
\ 
of company 2, representing a fraction a of the total 
outstanding stock 82-
The return to the ·equityholder of firm 2: 
~nd Nit = (llCFjt - llCFjt-l) IllCFjt-l = Njt as the _ ~~~u~~ for fir~ j and 
18 also equal to Nit . --- --
This implies that within the same class, the expected rate 
of return is same for all firms and therefore different firms' 
shares within the same class are perfect substitutes. 
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Now he sells his holding of firm 2 shares and invests 
in firm 1 by the amount of sI where sI = a (8 2 + D2). 
However, since he only has aS2 dollar, he can only achieve 
the portfolio by borrowing aD2 wi th a82 as pledge. Note 
that sI is the amount invested in equity of the firm 1. As 
a resul t, he holds SI /81 = a (8 2 + D2) / SI fraction of the share 
of the firm 1 Then the equityholder's income is: 
The reason for the need to deduct raD2 is that the 
investor has to pay his own personal borrowing. Note that 
in this case perf ect capi tal market assumption is used 
because we assume the same interest rate charged for 
company and individual. 
Noted if V2 > Vl => Y1 > Y2 . This means that by the 
same amount of money ie; SI) dollars ' 
tJ 
worth of shares of 
company 2, the investors will be benefited from selling 
firm 2 equity and buying firm 1 equity, this will drive 
down the price of ~quity of firm 2 ~nd decrease its firm 
value at the same time and the price of the equity of the 
firm 1 will rise and its value will increase, in 
equilibriul!l_, . V2 = VI. 
On the other hand., if V2 < VI· 
Initially, an investor holds an amount SI of shares of 
company I, representing a fraction a of the total 
outstanding stock SI. His return is Y1 = (sl/8i)*X = aX. 
The investor will sell equity of firm 1 by SI in 
exchange for the portfolio of firm 2 consisting of s2 dollar 
11 
of stock of company 2 and d dollar of bonds. The new 
portfolio is 52 + d 2 = 51. 
return from stock in new portfolio is s2(X - rD 2)/s2; 
return from bonds is r. 
The return to the new portfolio is: 
Y2 = s2* (X - rD 2) /S2 + r*d2 =sl * (X-rD2) /V2 + r*sl*D 2/V2 
= (sl/V2)*X = a(SI/v2)*X 
= a*X*Sl/V2 but Vi = SI if VI ) V2 ==) Y2 ) Y1 .. 
By this simple argument, they show that the value of 
the firm is independent of the capital structure within the 
same risky class. 
Further r in their article published in 1963, they 
extended their model by incorporating company tax factor 
and this greatly modified the result. 
A.l.3) Their extension (1963) .. [46J 
Since in~~rest payments on detit is tax deductible, the 
after- tax cash flow is in the form; 
" (X-rD) (l-t) + rDo -----------------1) 
where t is the corporate tax rate, or, expressed in 
alternative way as: 
X(l-t) + trD -------------------2) 
Since the value of the firm is expressed in current 
dollar, we discount equation 2) back to the present time. 
6 This equation implies the total cash flow available to the 
private sector., ie, bondholders and shareholders. 
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So, 
VL = (l-t)X/L + trD/r -------------------3) 
- VL is the value of the levered firm 
- L is the rate at which the market capitalizes the 
expected returns of an unlevered firm. 
r is the rate for discounting risk free debt. 
Therefore, equation 3) becomes: 
VL = Vu + tD ------------------ 4) 
It is obvious that the value of the levered firm is an 
increasing function of the amount of the debt issued and so 
the leverage ratio of a firm is no longer independent of 
financial investment decision. In other words, it is 
advantageous for firms to finance with all the debts in the 
presence of the tax deductibility of debt payments. 
Obviously, there is no firm in the world consists of 
creditors only, there must be owners in a firm. Perhaps, 
the claim can be expressed as follows: with the existence 
of corpora te tax rate, it is advantageous for a firm to 
finance its investment with debt as; many as possible and 
this can minimize its cost of capital. 
However, despite the theoretical beauty of the model, 
their all debt financial result is obviously inconsistent 
wi th empirical resul ts. No firm in the world coincides 
with their prediction. There must be something missing in 
their model. Inheri ted from the methodology of the M-M 
theorem, many writers put forwards their theories to remedy 
the M-M theorem. 
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A.2) Other extensions concerning the static tradeoff model. 
Based on the spirit of the M-M theorem like the use of 
cash flow concept and the incorporation of tax factor, many 
theorists add new elements to the theory of the optimal 
capi tal structure, incl uding bankruptcy cos ts [36], the 
potential loss of nondebt tax shields in non-default states 
[14], personal tax rate [44] etc. 
We hereby briefly examine them on the basis of the 
paper written Bradley et al [8]. This paper develops a 
model that incorporates all main modifications to the M-M 
theorem but their methodology is along with the M-M theorem 
spiri t. We will explore the development of the static 
tradeoff model with the aid of this paper's approach. 
A.3} The model. 
A.3.1) Assumptions: 
1) A two period model is adopted (t=O,t=l); 
2) The use of state-preference apprpach which firms issue 
debts can go in to bankruptcy and incur bankruptcy 
costs in some states of nature; 
a) Definition of bankruptcy when the income of a 
corporation is unable to payor reach agreement with its 
creditors. 
b) Definition of bankruptcy costs - if the firm fails to 
meet its debt payment, it includes various kinds of costs: 
i) direct costs of bankruptcy~ proceedings in the 
form of administrative expenses (trustee's 
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fees, legal fees, referee's fees). 
ii} - the drop in business due to negative image of 
bankruptcy. 
3) Debt payments (interest and principle - because it is 
a one period model) are fully tax deductible; corporate tax 
is based on end-of-period income; 
4) At the personnel level, household faces a progressive 
tax rate on bond and but a constant tax rate on equity (the 
D.S. taxation structure); 
5) Firms have deductible non-cash charges like 
depreciation as well as tax credits; 
6) For simplicity, households are assumed risk neutral. 
This avoids risk aversion adjustment and centres the 
problem only on returns. 
A.3.2) Notations: 
1) X - a random variable which denotes end of period 
income before taxes and interest payment; 
-, 
2 ) RI the total end-of-period i promised payment to 
bondholders; 
3) le - corporate income tax rate; 
4) tpb - p-ersonal tax rate on bond which is progressive; 
5) tpe - personal tax rate on equity which is constant; 
6) ~ - corporate tax deductions resulting from non-cash 
charges such as accounting depreciation and tax credits. 
7 ) Xk bankruptcy costs as a fraction of expected 
returns in the state of bankruptcy. 
7 R includes principal as well as interest payment. 
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8) rO - the rate of return of de .faul t-free, tax-exempt 
bonds. 
A.3.3) Setup. 
In this literature, cash flow approach is adopted for 
the sake of 
tradition. 
inheriting from Modigliani and Miller 
The firm issues two kinds of securities: 
1) Equity - which has limited liability (ie. the min 
value of the equity is zero). 
2) Risky debt - which bears a contractual payment at the 
end of period. In some states of nature, the firm cannot 
fulfil its obligation. 
In period 1, the gross end-of-period returns to 
bondholders is: 
= X(l-k} 
if X ~ R (the receipts can cover debt 
paymen t) ; 
if X < R (the receipts cannot cover 
debt ; payment and Xk 
bankruptcy costs incurred) . 
In period l~the gross-end-of period returns to stockholder 
is: 
YE = (X-R) (I-Le) + QLc if X ~ R + Q (the earnings 
are large enough for the firm 
to fully utilize the non-debt 
tax shield Cl) ; 
= X - R if R ~ X < R + Q (the firm pays no tax 
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because the amount of taxable 
income x-R-6< 0); 
= 0 if X < R (no return to equityholders 
and all receipts go to the 
creditors) . 
Since the above conditions are measured in period t=l, 
and when we talk about the market value of the firm lit 
means the present value of debt and equity. 
The market value of the firm's equity is after taking 
personal tax into account is: 
R+~ 
+ Rr{ X - R) f (X) dX } --------------1) 
When the market value of the bond is: 
B = ( 1 - t pb) I (1 + r 0) {( R f (X) dX + { X ( 1 - k) f (X) dX} - - - - 2) 
Consequently, the market value of the firm given 
equation 1) and equation 2) is: 
V firm 
R 
= 1/ ( 1 +r 0) [( 1- t pb ) rX ( 1-k) f (X) dX 
. 0 
--------------3) 
We will see that equation 3) can be used to explain 
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the main theoretical development of static tradeoff model. 
Starting from the M-M theorem, many writers like 
Kraus, A. and R. Litzenberger said bankruptcy costs can 
prevent the firm from issuing too many risky debts and 
therefore, optimal leverage exists by balancing costs and 
benefits of debt financing [36]. 
Afterwards, rli 11 er enriched the literature by 
introducing personal taxes into the model and got a result 
that the presence of personal taxes can 
counterbalance the benefits of interest 
finally 
payment 
deductibility and no optimal leverage occurs at the 
individual level. Recently, DeAngelo and Masu1is put non-
debt tax shields in non-default states [14]. 
Returned to the equation 3) and we make use of it to 
account for the above writers' ideas. 
First we would like to search for an optimal R~ such 
that the value of the firm is maximized. We differentiate 
V with respect to R and the result is: 
VR = (l-t pb ) / Cl+rO) {[l-F (R)] [1- (I-Le) (l-tps ) / (l-tpb )] 
- (l-tps)Lc/(l-tpb) [F(R+Cl)-F(R)] - kRf(R)} 
7----------------4) 
where F(.) is the cumulative probability density 
function of X. Now, we make use of equation 4) to examine 
the models mentioned above. 
1) The crude M-M irrelevant theorem. 
The crude M-M theorem assumes all debts are default-
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free, no bankruptcy costs, no non-debt tax shield and no 
taxation at all. By this construction, it implies 
Moreover, since in all states of nature, 
the firm is able to pay the debt, there IS no probability 
of bankruptcy, the equation 4) then becomes: 
VR = 0 for all level of debt and financing policy 
does not affect the value of a firm. 
2) The introduction of bankruptcy costs. [36J 
At first, after Modigliani and Miller introduced the 
interest payment~ tax deductibility in their model, an 
immediate response to this benefit of debt financing is the 
incorporation of bankruptcy costs in the literature. By 
equation 4), assume tpc=tps=C=O but k is not equal to zero, 
we obtain: 
VR = 1/(1+rO) ([l-F(R)]tc - kRf(R) 1 ----------5) 
When y..;e search for an optimal solution, we set it 
equal to zero, implying: 
[l-F(R)]t
c 
= kRf(R) ----------5') 
By equa tion 5'), we examine tha t the LHS is the 
probability of non-default state times the benefits of 
issuing debt which is the tax saving~ from interest 
payment(=t ), while the RHS is the marginal increase in 
c 
expected costs of bankruptcy. As a result, we are able to 
obtain an optimal RX by solving equation 5'). 
In contradiction to the result of the all debt-
financing resul t I the bankruptcy costs can explain why a 
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.\ ~~ ,1 !' ~ ~ l: ~ t i t 11 ~ \ -.. 1 111 t::'l \.1 f t h f' f i l' m 
3. !"i ~-: :-} C > d n k r 1.1 p t (' Y COS t s 3. S h" e 11 3. s t a. x f re e non cas 11 
The eqU3 t il...Jn -J) then becomes: 
\ -~ = 1 / ( l - r, , ~ i [1 - F ( R ) 1 t - [ 1 - F ( R) ] t , } - - - - - - - - - - - b) ~. . - . .' .. - - \... . ~ ~~ ;: (: 
set 3quation 6) equal to zero, this implies; 
The reason for rhls condi tion 'is that: it is still 
true that the o\ .. :ners of a levered corporation have the 
ad\-antage of deducting their interest payments in computing 
their corporate lncome tax, but at the personal level, 
investors have to be compensated for the tax disadvantage 
of holding debts because the tax rate from debt is greater 
than those for stock (like the U. s. and equal to zero 
there) . 
Now, suppose we have fully tax-exempt bonds like those 
of state and local governments and pay in interest rate. For 
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corporate bonds, in order to entice taxable investors, it 
has to pay the interest rate i* higher than in and up to 
\) 
It is because the tax savings from bond 
on the corporate level is Le' therefore, the maximum rate a 
corporate is ~'illing to pay is i~ (I-Le) =i O or i*=iOI (I-Le) 
~ore precisely, for an individual whose marginal rate 
of personal income tax on interest income is Lpb' the demand 
for taxable corporate bonds would be the rate on tax 
exempts grossed up by the marginal tax rate, i.e., i O/(I-
L~ r. ). As a result, for an equilibrium to be obtained, this 
:--:..J 
implies L ... =LT\~' . If this condi tion is fulfilled, the net tax 
'_ .i ! ./ 
ad\:antage of debt is zero and once a firm has to issue 
bond lit has to pay the rate i s/ (l-Lpb) =i*=i,,/(l-L )3 (j C and 
therefore no optimal leverage results in. 
The contribution of Miller to the literature is that 
it once again denies the existence of optimal leverage J and 
implies that any firm pursues different capital structure 
policy will find their investors in different brackets. 
~ ) DeAn gel 0 and :-1 as u 1 i s ( 1 .J] • 
In their article, they assume no personal tax on 
income from stock(t~ ~ =O). Again, by using equation 4) ;;= 
It becpmes: 
·3 notes that L ... ~ is different for different bracket of 
investors. In conseqJ~nce, companies following a non-leverage or 
low leverage strategy would find a market among investors in the 
high tax brackets; those opting for a high leverage policy would 
find their investors in the low tax brackets. 
9 ~iller says that there is no optimal leverage ratio for 
each firm, but there exists an optimal ratio for the economy as 
a whole. 
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VR = 1/(l+rO)*{[1-F(R)](tc - t pb ) - tc[F(R+l)) - F(R)] 
- (l-tpb ) kRf (R)} ---------------- 7) 
For optimal condi tion, we set equation 7) equal to 
zero: 
==) tc - tpb = {tc [F (R + C)) - F ( R) + (1- t pb ) kRf (R) } I [1-F (R) ] 
------------------ 7') 
Note that as long as either 0 or k is positive, the 
RHS of the equa tion 7') is posi ti ve and therefore I tc ) tpb" 
Moreover I when debt policy is irrelevant, that means VR = 0 
for all R, however, from equation 7'), it is unlikely that 
it will equal to zero for all R unless k=O=O.. As a result, 
in contrast to what Miller proposed of irrelevant leverage 
policy, they once again confirmed the existence of optimal 
capital structure .. 
Furthermore I in contradiction to Miller model tpb=tc I 
they get the resul t of Le ) t pb ' this means tha t the net tax 
advantage of debt at the corporate level must be large 
enough not only to compensate for the disadvantage of tax 
at the persona~ level but a~s9 to . overcome the cost of 
bankruptcy as well as the probability of wasting nondebt 
tax deductibility when the level of debts is increasing .. 
The prnbability of wasting nondebt tax deductibility 
when more debts are issued can be interpreted in the 
following way: the equityholders are the 'residual income' 
earners, when the level of debt is increasing, the 
equityholders have to pay more for interest payment (in this 
case principal also), and less will be left for taxation 
and therefore unlikely to enjoy nondebt tax deductibility 
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like depreciation and tax credit. In consequence, the 
increasing probability of wasting nondebt tax shields 
(reflected in the F(R+Q) in the equation 7') affects the 
value of the firm because nO\\l the value of the firm is 
affected by those probabilities too. 
To conclude this section, it 1S undoubtedly true 
that the static tradeoff theory maintains economic spirit 
in Hays of costs and benefi ts analysis. Further, they 
maintain the main distinguished feature of the M-M model, 
ie; corporate tax rate, cash flow. 
In contrast to this, there are other schools that try 
to enrich the literature by adopting completely different 
approaches. They are the agency cost model and the 
asymmetric information model. 
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B) The Agency costs model 
One underlying assumption of the static tradeoff model 
is that the management level maximizes the value of the 
firm, and therefore the wealth of the equityholders. 
However, the rise of the transaction costs as well as 
principal-agent problem in economics also sheds light on 
the finance theory. 
model. 
In our literature, it is agency costs 
In short, agency cost model says that the management 
is not necessarily in a position to maximize the value of 
the firm or the welfare of the owner. It is because the 
separation of ownership and control, or in modern words, 
principal-agent diversion of interest that creates the 
problem. 
The most important paper of the application of the 
agency costs to the analysis of the leverage problem is the 
joint paper written by Jensen, M.C and Meckling, W. [25]. 
In the paper, they point out that management level has 
its own utility function which is supposed to be different 
from the ownerships' ones. As a resul t, when management 
maximizes their own utility function, the outcomes or the 
investments they perform may not be necessarily matched 
with the owners' ones. 
We here do not introduce the model in detail. Only 
the model spirit is introduced and detail elaboration is 
omitted. 
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B.l) What are agency costs? 
In brief, there are three kinds of agency costs: 
a) the moni taring expendi tures by the principal in 
order to limit the aberrant activities of the agents. 
b) - the bonding expenditure by the agent to guarantee 
that he will not perform such aberrant activities. 
c) the loss experienced by the principal due to 
inadequate or ineffective monitoring activities or bonding 
activities. 
Since a firm's capital includes debts and equity, we 
would like to examine the agency costs of them 
respectively. 
B.2} The agency costs of equity. 
In their view, if an owner of a firm owns all equity, 
there is no incenti ve problem because he bears all the 
costs and benefits of an investment or his action. 
However, in the real world, corporations/firms are usually 
run by managers who are supposed not to have full 
ownership. In their model, they assume that managers own 
certain fraction of the total equity but less than full 
ownership. 
Besid~s normal monetary returns to managers, they 
define nonpecuniary returns as 'various non-pecuniary 
aspects of his entrepreneurial activities such as the 
physical appointments of the office, the attractiveness of 
the secretarial staff, the level of employee discipline, a 
larger than optimal computer to play wi th ... ' In fact, it 
is the nonpecuniary returns that provides the incentive for 
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managers to deviate from owners' interest. 
Assume $1 of current value of nonpecuniary benefits 
withdrawn from the firm by the manager and this is assumed 
to reduce the market value of the firm by SI. In fact, 
this kind of activity exhausts resources which can be used 
for improving firm's value activities like learning new 
technology etc. 
As the manager owns only a fraction of the total 
equity, says a, then the consumption of one extra dollar 
equivalent to nonpecuniary benefits only costs him a*l 
dollar fall in the value of the firm. Since he needs not 
bear all the costs of the diminution in the value of the 
firm but he consumes all the benefi ts of nonpecuniary 
consumption, he will enjoy more 'pork consumption' than one 
who owns 100% of the firm. 
Nevertheless, one point worthy mentioning is that it 
is incorrect to say that a manager will not consume any 
nonpecuniary returns even if he owns 100% of the firm. It 
only means that if the manager owns ~ess than 100% equity, 
he will consume extra nonpecuniary returns and reduce firm 
value larger than full ownership. 
B.3) The agency costs of debt. 
Their analysis of the agency costs of debt borrowed 
ideas from Black-Scholes option pricing model. Briefly 
speaking, the agency cost of debt is the transfer of wealth 
from the bondholders to the equityholders. 
The nature of the agency costs of debt can be easily 
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understood by intuition. It is because the limited 
liability protects the shareholders. When they are engaged 
in some investment activities with very low probability of 
success but wi th high payoffs if succeeds, it is the 
credi tors whose bear all the costs but th h h ld . , e s are 0 ers 
receive the main returns. For example, when a firm has 2 










S200000 (0.05 ) 
where costs = S10000, the figure in the bracket is the 
probability of this state of nature occurs. 
In this example, the cost is equal to expected return 
for both projects ($10000). 
Suppose the management asks the lender to request 
$9500 loan and promises to take project 1. But after the 
fund is obtained, he swifts to project 2. In this case, it 
is clear that the creditors bear all the risk because the 
equityholders are protected by limited liability. Yet, if 
project 2 -succeeds, the management reaps most benefi ts! 
(That is, in the case of failure, the shareholders only 
lose $500; whereas in the case of success, the shareholders 
gain $190500 instead.) 
In view of this, debt holders must charge higher ex 
ante yields to compensate for this irresponsible behaviour 
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or they design various types of agreements in the debt 
contract to limi t this behaviour and this will lncrease 
transaction costs. Owing to the possibility of the 
transfer of wealth from the bondholders to the 
shareholders, higher yield or protective measures must be 
adopted and this will consume resources and reduce the firm 
value in the end. 
B.3) Agency costs and capital structure. 
With regar~ to whether there exists optimal capital 
structure, they argue that when the firm issues more debts, 
its agency costs of debt will increase but agency costs of 
equity will decrease and vice versa. As a result, it is 
possible to obtain optimal capital structure determined by 
minimizing total agency cost! (see fig 1) 
Fig 1 
~p-U ~L- 0j).('r~t i,irv'~r4. 
Beside the agency costs model and the static tradeoff 
model, the asymmetric information school also makes their 
contribution to the capital structure problem. 
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C) The asymmetric information approach. 
After Akerlof's famous paper [1], many economic 
theories made use of his approach to build up their 
economic models. 
exception. 
Of course, finance theory is of no 
In 1984, S. C. Myers together with N. S. Majluf wrote 
a paper answered the capital structure problem using 
asymmetric information approach [48], they argue that there 
is no optimal capital structure problem as · mentioned in the 
static tradeoff theory. In other words, we cannot set an 
optimal debt-equity ratio by balancing costs and benefits 
of different financial instruments. Moreover, how a firm 
financing its investment is according to a pecking order: 
a firm first utilizes retained earnings/slacks, if resorts 
to external financing, then issue default-free debt, 
followed by risky debt and equity in the end. In fact, to 
a certain extent, their model fits some empirical evidence. 
Moreover, theY,explained why an announcement of stock issue 
will lead to a drop in the stock pri~es. 
In the next section, we will introduce the model 
presented by them. 
e.l) The model. 
C.1.1) Assumptions: 
1) Asymmetric information 
information than the investors. 
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the manage~ent has more 
This may be due to their 
investment in management activities or capability of 
collecting more information because of 
role. In this case, wi th regard to an 
their management 
investment, this 
means that the management knows the actual values of the 
results of their projects like Net Present Value (NPV) or 
the actual values of a firm's existing assets. 
On the contrary, investors only know the distribution 
of the NPV and the distribution of the values of a firm's 
existing assets. 
2) Management acts In the interest of the 'old' 
shareholders. They maximize the intrinsic value of the old 
shares. The intrinsic value of the old shares may not be 
necessarily the same as their market value at the time when 
asymmetric information still presents. 
Moreover, they also assume that the old shareholders 
are passive, ie. they will not change their portfolio 
decision by selling or buying the firm's shares whatever 
the decision taken by the management. It is because by 
their model, the firm will sometimes deliberately forgive 
some projects with Net Present Valu~. If a stockholder is 
not passive, learning this behaviour will make them adjusts 
their portfolio. In brief, the firm maximizes the 
intrinsic~quity value of existing passive equity-holders. 
C.l.2) An outline of the model. 
a) A three date model, t = -1, 0 and +1. In different 
period of time, managers and investors/markets grasp 
different information about the NPV of the project and the 
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value of the assets. It is summarized l'n t bl 2 
.a . e • 
Table 2 















of A and B; S 
Narket Distributions 
of A and B; S 
b) Notations: 
a I b; S 
Distributions 
of A and 8; S; 
also E, either 
E=O or E=I-S 
a , b 
a, b 
1) S - the sum of cash on hand and marketable securities. 
It is referred to be financial slack. 
2) I - investment. 
3) E=I-S be the amount of new equi ty needed to issue 
where S is the slack or retained earning or assets wi th 
high liquidity. 
4) A is the distribution of the value of the asset-in-
place. At t=-l and t=O, the market only knows the 
distribution of the asset~in-place. 
The mean value of the A is notated by A. At t=O, the 
manager knows the true value of A,i.e. a. 
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5) Similarly, B is the distribution of the Net Present 
Value at t=-l for the market and the manager. But at t=O, 
the market also knows only distribution while the manager 
knows the true value. 
By the same token, the expected value of the B is 
denoted by B . 
At t=O, the manager knows the true value of B,i.e. b. 
-In addition, any negative values of a, b are ruled 
out. 
6) Let P I is the market value of old stockholders I share 
if stock is issued at t=O. 
7) Let P is the market value of old stockholders' share 
if stock is not issued at t=O. 
8) Let VoId is the intrinsic value of the old equi ty .. 
9) Let Vnew is the intrinsic value of the newly issued 
equity .. 
e.l.3) . By varying slack S, we -,{ary the size of the 
required issue. Since the firm knows a and b at t=O. If 
he decides not to issue, this implies the true value of the 
old share is VoId = S + aID 
Before going on to the formal elaboration, the spirit 
of their model is better understood through an example 
provided by them in table 3. 
10 Usually, present value total liability is regarded as 
the market value of the firm. However, since total liabili ty 
equal total assets. Therefore, we here use total asset to 
represent market value of the firm. 
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The firm has no internal fund. 
state 2 I I 
a=50 : 
b=lO 
0.5 I I 
The 
investment requests 1=100. Therefore, the firm has to 
issue E=100 to finance investment. 
Now if the firm issues stock in whatever states of 
nature. At t=O, investors know only distributions of 
asset-in-place and NPV and therefore form expectation 
accordingly. Therefore, this implies; 
E(A)=lOO; E(B)=15 
Therefore, the market value of the old equi ty lS 
P'=115 and by issuing stock, the value of the new stock E 
is simply 100. As a resul t, if tl\le manager decides to 
issue in whatever state, the market value of the firm is 
215. , i.e. P'+E. 
In fact~ "the true value of the firm in state 1 is 270, 
ie., the sum of E+a+b where E=100, a=150, b=20. When we 
calculate the intrinsic valueltrue value of the old equity 
if state 1 occurs conditional on investors' expectation at 
t=o, it becomes: 
VoId = P' 1 (P , + E) * V 
= (1151215)*270 = 144.42 
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- where V is the true value of the firm if state 1 occurs. 
- P'/(P'+E) is the ratio shared by the old shares 
conditional on the market expectation in the case of 
issue because P', E are values obtained from market 
expectation. 
Where in state 2 at t=O; 
VoId = (115/215) *160 = 85.58 
If the market takes two states as equally probable, 
then the market value of the old shares is: 
P'=(1/2)*144.42 + (1/2)*85.58 =115 which is unbiased. 
On the other hand, the intrinsic value of new share at 
t=O in state 1 conditional of investors' expectation is: 
Vnew = El (P , + E) * V = ( 100/215) * 270 = 125. 58 
When the intrinsic value of new share at t=O in state 
2 is; 
vnew = (100/215) * 160 = 74. 42 
By the same token, the market value of the new equity 
is (1/2)*74.42 + (1/2)*125.58 = 100 = E which is also 
unbiased. 
If the management issues stock in all states, the 
issue itself signals nothing. 
However, unlike investors, the management knows the 
true value of Net Present Value and existing assets at t=O. 
They know that at t=O, the true value or intrinsic value of 
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the existing stocks is 150 (because, a=150) for no issue. 
Yet, the intrinsic value of the old equity based on 
investors' expectation is only 144.42. Since the manager 
knows which state will occur, this implies tha.t he will 
quit the project in state 1. 
On the contrary, in state 2 at t=O, if the management 
quits the project, the true value of the old stock which is 
simply 50 whilst the intrinsic value of the old share in 
case of issue is 85.58 based on investors' expectation. ' In 
this case, the management will issue in state 2. 
Ironically, the story is not yet over - although the 
investors do not know the true values of a and b; they do 
know the firm will adopt the above strategy. As a result, 
when the firm issues stock, this signals state 2. In other 
words, the state of nature is revealed once the firm issues 
or not! By knowing this, the market value of the old stock 
is 60 (because a+b=60) rather than 115 because investors 
know tha t s ta t ,e 2 occurs w.hen the ' man'agement i.ssues equi ty. 
Perhaps, one crucial point is that 'the investors usually 
regard state 1 as a 'good state' because they know that: 
when a firm does not issue equity, it is due to the fact 
that the true value of the existing stocks is larger than 
that given by the market. Therefore, the investors regard 
it as a good state. Similarly, when a firm issues new 
equity, it means that the true value of the existing equity 
is less than that given by the market. 
By this simple example, we know that a firm will 
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deliberately forfeit a project with positive NPV, and once 
the firm issues, its share price will drop because of its 
signaling effect. After using a numerical example to 
introduce the basic idea behind the asymmetric information 
model, we will go to the formal elaboration. 
C.l.4) Formal elaboration. 
First we define, E=I-S O~S~I 
By varying slack S, we vary the size of the issue. 
Since the management knows the values of NPV and existing 
assets (a and b) at t=O. In the case of issue, the 
intrinsic value of the existing stock is; 
VoId = (P'/P'+E)*(E+a+b+S) 
- old stockholders are better off if issue is: 
S+a ~ (P'/P'+E) * (E+S+a+b) or; 
(E/P')*(S+a) ~ E+b --------- (1) 
where S+a is the value of the old equity(is also the 
value of the firm) for no issue. 
By the above inequality, we know that when a project 
with high NPV will be likely taken. ~ On the contrary, when 
a firm's existing assets value is large, a project will be 
less likely adopted. 
C.l.5) Why in the case of equity issue, the market value 
(not stock price) of the existing equity drop - a formal 
proof. 
Now, we want to prove P' < P if the probability of 
issue is less than one. 
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By equation (1), we know that under the condition that 
a firm decides not to issue is: 
a + S > P'*(l+b/E) 
----------- 2) 
where a + S = P (market value of the existing shares when 
a firm does not issue) 
===> P > P' (1+ b/E) 
where b/E > 0 because we rule out negative b 
===> P > pI 
Since we know that P is the market value of the 
existing equity if new shares are not issued while pI lS 
the market value of the existing equity if new shares are 
issued. P must exceed P I and price must fall when the 
issue-invest decision is revealed. P exceeds P I because 
investors rationally interpret the decision not to issue as 
good news about the true value of the firm. 
We now go on to the next section which explains why 
the firm financing decision is according to the pecking 
order, l. e. a firm will finance an investment first by 
retained earnings, debt and equity in the end. 
C.1.7) Pecking order. 
In this section, we examine why firms adopt a pecking 
order of financing method. In other words, when an 
investment is financed, it must first resort to internal 
sources and when it is necessary to use external financing, 
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it will first use the safest one and equity in the end. 
a) If the firm maintains slack/internal financing, it 
\.;il1 not pass up a positive NPV project because by the 
assumption of maximizing intrinsic value of existing 
shares, using slack to finance investment will not lead to 
decrease of the value of the old equity. If slack is large 
enough that it has no need to use external financing, it 
will take up every project with positive NPV. 
b) However, if the internal source is exhausted, it will 
first issue debt. 
Let's transform the model in another way. The firm 
will issue and invest only if: the firm issues an invests 
if VOId, the intrinsic value of the old stockholders', is 
higher with the issue than without it. 
Now, assumed at t=O, the firm decides to issue debt or 
equity after knowing the true values of a and b. 
The firm will issue stock when: 
S+a :::; S+a+b-OE 
where OE represents the gain of new equity from t=O to 
t=+l, i. e. OE=E1-E. E ~ is the market value of the new 
1 
shares at t=+l issued at t=O where its price at t=O is E. 
Therefore, OE is the new shareholders' capital gain or loss 
when the truth comes out at t=+l. 
The left-hand side of the inequality represents the 
firm value of no issue (equal true value of the existing 
stock), while the right-hand side stands for the value of 
the firm after issue (S+a+b) minus change in the value of 
the new equity. 
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Or, trivially, we can simply write it into b > cJE. 
That means the gain of the old stockholders (b) must be 
large enough to outrun the loss to new equityholders. In 
fact OE can be either positive or negative to investors. 
Now, by the same reasoning, if debt lS issued, we 
follow the same argument, i.e. b > 60. 
In the event of debt issue: 
i) When the debt is riskless, this implies 00 = o. In 
consequence, we take every project which can guarantee 
positive NPV. 
ii) But if the debt is risky one, the problem is not so 
straight forward. It is because when choosing equi ty 
financing or debt financing, it has to compare whether b-OE 
is larger, equal or smaller than b-Cill. Therefore, if the 
firm decides to issue equity, this implies OE < OD. 
However, one point worthy mentioning is that eJE or OD can 
be either positive or negative. 
c) By the option pricing theory developed by Galai and 
Masulis, it tells us tha t cm will have the same sign as OE, 
but 00 absolute value will always he less. ie IODI < 
If a firm decides to issue equi ty, it implies that 
QE<QD; however, by the Galai and Masulis result(1976}, we 
know that IOEI> IcJDI and have the same sign. 
This means tha t for the equi ty to be issued, both 
d . t . . e /\E < /\n and IOE I> IOD I mus t be held a t the con l lons, l. . U uu 
same time. Not surprisingly, it is possible to construct 
following cases that fulfil above two criteria: 
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1) If both have the positive sign, it implies that OE > 
OD and the firm will not issue equity_ 
2) (lE and On both are negative and IQEI>IOOI. But in 
this case, investors will not rationally buy either stock 
or debt because this implies a capital loss (remember OE 
and 00 is the change in price from t=O to t=+l). 
3) QE is negative and (lD is zero. This means E (which is 
the current price of newly issued equity) is so high that 
the investors will expect there is a capital loss; whilst 
for the debt, it can construct current price of debt such 
that the investors do not expect capital gain or loss. 
However, there is no investor who expects that there is a 
capital loss of the equity and but is willing to buy. 
Thus, their model may explain why many firms seem to 
prefer internal financing to financing by security issues 
and, when they do issue, why they seem to prefer bonds to 
stock. 
To close this section, we briefly summarize the 
results: 
a) Firms will deliberately give u~ positive NPV project 
in order not to hamper old stockholders' interest. b} WH1 
firms issue stock, their stock prices will drop because the 
market evaluates stock issue as signalling bad states. 
c) For financing investment I the firm will first use 
retained earning/slack, followed by default-free debt, 
risky debts and equity in the end. 
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D) The summarv 
This literature review briefly summarizes the 
development of the thought of the capital structure 
problem. The capital structure problem is an important 
issue in the financial economic field and attracts many 
top-class theorists to research on it. However, in fact, 
beside economics, there are other practical considerations 
when deciding to issue debt or equity like corporate 
control, project income cash flow etc. In fa.ct, a firm 
ability to issue debt or borrow money may be subject to 
many insti tutional factors. For instance f let a firm 
optimal debt level is 40 % of the total capital, however, 
owing to credit limit placed on this firm by financial 
institution, the firm can only get debt which 1S 30% of the 
total capital. 
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11) EMPIRICAL REVIEW 
After the M-M theorem, there are different kinds of 
theories to explain capital structure problem. As a 
result, these theories give rise to many testable 
hypotheses for empirical studies. Before going to the 
empirical review, one thing worthy mentioning is that 
different theories may result in same testable hypotheses 
because different theories are different in their 
approaches rather than by their results. 
This part of li terature, the same as theoretical 
review, is divided into three parts: 
A) testable hypotheses under the static tradeoff 
model; 
B) testable hypotheses under the agency costs model; 
C) testable hypotheses under the asymmetric 
information model. 
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A) Empirical review of the static tradeoff model 
The static tradeoff theory has undergone various 
stages. The development of its thought has been discussed 
in the theory review and will not be repeated here. This 
empirical review will introduce related empirical studies 
corresponding to the static tradeoff model. Noted that 
many of these empirical studies do not test the above 
models directly but can only test the deri ved testable 
results. 
Unfortunately, optimal capital structure, to a certain 
extent { is only theoretically beautiful. In fact ( we 
cannot solve optimal leverage ratio by an equation. 
Actually, empirical studies of the tradeoff model are 
performed in two ways: 
A.l) Separate costs side and benefits side respectively. 
A.l.l) Evaluation of bankruptcy costs. 
The most famous study was done b:y Jerold B. Warner in 
1977 [69]. He uses the case of railway bankruptcy to 
evaluate the bankruptcy cost which is roughly 5% for the 
railway industry. 
A.l.2) Evaluation of the benefits of tax savings. 
Since the corporate tax rate of a country, is seldom 
varied. As a result, if we want to find out the change of 
the tax rate on the benefit of tax savings, one approach is 
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to compare different countries' capital structure. In the 
article written by Janette Rutterford in 1985 (24]. She 
examines differences in aggregate corporate leverage ratios 
across five major industrial economies, specifically: 
France, West Germany, Japan, Britain and the United States. 
Rutterford considers the basic differences in the tax 
structures that potentially could give rise to the observed 
differences in aggregates leverage ratios. However, the 
observed differences in the leverage ratios may be due to 
the special contractual arrangement. For example, in 
Japan, commercial banks always own several corporate 
equities. This can facilitate the required mortgage or 
lessen the debt agency costs problem and results in higher 
debt ratios. To a certain extent this reflects the fact 
that even if we can make an international comparison for 
the sake of examining tax effects, many institutional 
factors can disturb the results. 
A.2) Testing various factors that are suspected to affect 
the capital structure of a firm. 
This is the most prevalent way of testing the static 
tradeoff model and this method will be tested in the part 
I of the empirical study of this thesis. 
Obviously, in deciding optimal leverage, there are 
obviously other factors . beside tax and bankruptcy costs 
that exert their effect. eg. size, return volatility. 
Actually, debt ratio cannot be independent of 
institutional factors. In other words ( even if we know 
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that for a firm A, the optimal debt ratio is 30%. However, 
this does not guarantee that the firm A can obtain the 
desired ratio because if the debt is financed by bank 
loans, it must be under the constraint of the credit line. 
In the case of bond issue, it must be subject to the 
factors of underwriting, rating problem which may not 
ensure that the firm can obtain 30% debt level for the firm 
A, too. Perhaps, the mos t importan t poin t is tha t those 
credit rationing or 




The testing of 
different firms' characteristics, in fact, can reflect the 
capacity of the debt level of a firm. 
Since most of these factors are related to the ability 
of repayment of interest and principal, they belong to 
bankruptcy costs side consideration which is under the 
heading of static tradeoff model. Those studies do not 
calculate the exact magnitude of different determinants. 
They only tell the signs of these 
determinantsjch~racteristics· on the leverage ratio. 
Those determinants/characteri~tics include size, 
growth rate, fixed asset(or collateral asset) I non-debt tax 
shields, profitability, income volatility, bankruptcy 
probability, advertising, R & D, free cash flow etc. 
Unfortunately, the signs on those characteristics are not 
uniquely agreeing on, for the same determinant, some 
studies get a positive sign but other studies get a 
negative sign. It is because these studies used different 
measures of the firm characteristics, different time 
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periods, different leverage measures, and different 
methodologies. 
There are many concerned studies, we only pick up few 
of them for illustration. 
a) In the article written by Titman and Wessels in 1988 
[67]. They find out the following determinant signs are: 
i) Volatility (-); 
b) 
ii) Fixed Assets (+); 
iii) Non-Debt tax shields (-); 
iv) Profitability (-); 
v) Growth opportunities (-); 
vi ) Si z e (-); 
vii) Uniqueness (-). 
In the article written by Marsh in 1982 (38]. 
signs of the determinants chosen are: 
i) Bankruptcy Probability (-); 
ii) Fixed Asset (+); 
iii) Size (+). 
The 
c) In the article written by Bradley et al in 1984 [8]. 
The determinants' signs are: 
i) Volatility (-); 
ii) Non-Debt Tax shields (+); 
iii) Advertising, R· & D (-). 
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B) Empirical studies of the agency costs model 
The theoretical literature review says that the agency 
costs problem arises because there exists conflict between 
manager and shareholder, or between debtholders . and 
equityholders. 
B.1) Conflict between managers and equityholders. 
If a manager owns less than 100% of the equity of a 
firm, he will not choose the optimal investment level which 
maximizes the firm value. For example, managers can invest 
less effort in managing firm resources and may be able to 
transfer firm resources to their own, personal benefi t, 
e. g., by consuming"perquisi tes" such as corpora te jets, 
plush offices. 
Consequently, theory predicts that an industry with 
large cash inflow but lacks investment chance, like 
tobacco, steel industry should have high debt level because 
high debt ratio reduces free cash flow to management for 
perquisites consumption. 
Unfortunately, we have not found a good empirical 
study that test the above hypothesis. 
B.2) Conflicts between shareholders and creditors. 
In the modern world, the limited liability provides 
protection for the shareholder. For simplicity, by 
borrowing money, if an investment yi.elds large returns, 
11 above the face value of the debt, equityholders we ' 
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capture most of the gain. On the contrary, if the 
investment fails, the debtholders bear most of the costs. 
However, if the creditors know this practice, they will set 
debt contracts so that either the equityholders bear the 
misbehavioural costs, that is, higher interest rate; or 
they design the contract in the way that delimit 
investments away from new, unrelated lines of business. 
B.2.1) Empirical studies about debt contracts that are 
designed to prevent misbehaviour. 
In the article written by Smith and Warner in 1979 
[59] they support this view. 
B.2.2) Empirical studies about the extension that 
leverage increases with lack of growth opportunities. 
When an industry has few risky project, it is unlikely 
tha t the shareholders can gain a t the expense of the 
debtholders. Those industries with few growth opportunities 
fi t this characteristic. ,i. e. an industry wi th higher 
growth opportunity must have a higher debt ratio. 
a) This claim is supported by the study of Titrnan and 
Wessels in 1988 [67]. 
b} Also evidence is from the study of Kim and Sorensen in 
1986 [33]. 
c) However, opposite result is from the article written 
by Kester in 1986 [27]. 
Unlike static tradeoff model, which we can directly test 
for the determinants grouping under benefit side or cost 
side(like estimates of tax-saving, bankruptcy costs), 
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we cannot directly test for the amount of "agency costs". 
We are unable to tell you how large is the agency costs of 
debts. We can only test the observed testable hypotheses 
derived from the theory of agency costs model rather than 
testing the magnitude of 'costs' itself. 
C) Empirical studies of the asymmetric information 
model 
The introduction of the asymmetric information into 
the analysis of capital structure generates many 
interesting results which are more coincided with our 
observations. 
Perhaps there are three main testable hypotheses 
derived from this school: 
1) stock price decreases on announcement of equity issue. 
2) there is a pecking order of financing decision, i.e. the 
order is that firms make use of internal financing, 
riskless d~bt( risky debt and· equity in the end. 
3) firms tend to issue equi ty following abnormal price 
appreciation .. 
We now examine them one by one. 
C.1) Stock price decreases on announcement of stock 
issue/announcement effect. 
The announcement effect, perhaps, is one of the most 
important testable hypothesis in the asymmetric information 
school because of its widespread evidence. Perhaps, 
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the announcement effect is a common phenomena in the world 
but it needs a good explanation for it. The asymmetric 
information approach remedies this loophole and therefore 
becomes the most important testable hypothesis in the 
capital structure theory. The announcement effect will be 
tested in the part 1I empirical study. 
As mentioned in the theoretical li terature review, 
when a firm issues stock, investors regard it as bad news. 
Naturally, if a firm issues stock in every states, 
investors will not take issue as a signal of bad 
performance. However, since investors know that a firm 
will not issue stock in every state. Moreover, they also 
know that if a firm issue, it must issue when the firm is 
In the bad state(Please refer to the theory review). 
Originally, when firms do not issue, investors only have 
conditional expectation of the stock price. Once the firms 
decides to issue, it reveals to the investors that the 
firms are in the bad state and investors will know the true 
state of the fjrm (bad s~ate} and reflect in the drop of 
stock price. 
The above claim is supported by many empirical 
studies, they are: 
a) in the article written by Asquith & Mullins in 
1986 [3]; 
b) in the article written by Masulis and Korwar in 
1986 [40]. 
c) in the article wri t ten by Mikkel son & Parteh in 
1986 [41]. 
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C.2) Pecking order financing decision. 
The reason for the existence of pecking order theory 
has been analyzed in the theoretical literature section. 
When using internal funds, it will not have any adverse 
information signalling problem. As a result, it can take 
every project which can guarantee positive NPV. When 
external financing is needed, debt is preferred to equity. 
The corresponding studies come from: 
a) Evidence is from the Amihud et al in 1990 [2]. 
b) However, opposite evidence is from Korajczyk et al in 
1990 [35]. 
C.3) Firms tend to issue stock after abnormal price rise. 
Abnormal price rise here is not talking about the 
stock market abnormal price rises, it lS related to the 
abnormal price rise of that firm's stock. It is because 
the market only has the condi tional expectation of that 
stock price. If the firms are in the bad states, their 
stock prices are overvalued by the market. If finally they 
turn out to issue, this tells us that the firms' stock 
prices have been overvalued by the ~arket and the firms' 
stock prices will drop. However, firms itself also know 
this pattern, therefore, they will choose the timing of 
issue when the price is high to minimize the adverse effect 
of price drop. 
The claim is supported by two articles: 
a) The article written by Korajczyk et al in 1990 [35]. 
b) From the article of Marsh in 1982 [37]. 
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d) SUMMARY 
We here only want to 
testable hypothesis derived 
pick up the mos t 
from the capi tal 
theories which are relevant to this thesis. 
important 
structure 
Actually, this empirical review is far from completely 
to capture all the empirical results related to the capital 
structure theory. Perhaps, the main purpose of the review 
is to provide a preliminary understanding of the literature 
and its development rather than states everything about the 
capital structure theories. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
EMPIRICAL RESULT: PART I 
In this chapter, we would like to test the signs of 
different determinants on the debt ratio in Hong Kong. As 
mentioned in the introduction, this kind of empirical study 
can be grouped under the tenet of the traditional static 
tradeoff model because it captures the bankruptcy cost side 
effect. We use different proxies to approximate the nature 
of some firm characteristics like size, growth rate etc_ 
Besides this, an additional result of industry 
influence on the debt ratio will be presented. Not 
surprisingly, different industries have distinct debt 
ratios because it is normally predicted that capital 
structure must show significant difference across 
industries because various industries have specific kinds 
of business risks which is directly related to bankruptcy 
costs. · For instance, hotel industry is subject to cyclical 
demands, properties are affected by fundamental economic 
strength, interest rate and political atmosphere etc. The 
separation of the two resul ts is that one study pays 
attention to the nature of some firm characteristics while 
another emphasizes the impact of industrial 
characteristics. Since their foci are different, this 
research examines them respectively. 
Now we proceed to the part I empirical study. 
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I) The empirical study 
A) The data 
The data is from the tape named 'PACAp 1 which is 
available from the Business Administration of the CUHK_ 
The 'PACAP' divides the data into seven classes11 : 
1) Finance; 
2) Utilities (11); 
3 ) Properties (100) ; 
4 ) Consolidated Enterprises ( 80) ; 
5) Industrials (71) ; 
6) Hotels ( 17) ; 
7 ) Others ( 8) _ 
However, in this study, we exclude finance sector because 
finance sector must have high debt ratio. Normally, 
finance sector acts as a middleman between surplus unit and 
deficit unit in an economy_ Since deposits appear on the 
liabili ty side of the balance sheet as debts, it must 
result in high debt ratio in the end. The figures in the 
bracket are the number of firms in this sector. 
B) The Methodology 
1) In this thesis, cross-section method is adopted, i.e. 
we run a regression across firms in Hong Kong. 
2) The period taken in this project is from 1986-1990 
11 The division by PACAP is the same as the division by the 
Hong Kong Index. 
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because of the presence of more sample firms and the data 
is more updated. The use of five-year data is due to: 
a) We can use the average value to get rid of unusual 
fluctuation; 
b) A variable like earning risk/volatility has to use 
more than a year data in order to calculate the standard 
deviation. 
3) Simple Ordinary Least Square method is adopted. 
C) DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES 
All of the following variables are evaluated at the 
book values .. 
1) Debt ratio is calculated as the long term debts 
divided by total asset on the book value. The use of long 
term debts has three prime reasons: 
a) It is the accounting practice to define debt ratio by 
using long term debt. 
b) Moreover, if we include all kinds of liability like 
account payable, overdraft ete, the debt ratio will 
fluctu~te away from its 'target rati6' drastically because 
those short-term loans are usually used for daily 
operations. 
c) In fact, the choice of equity-financing or debt-
financing is originally for investment purpose which 
implies that the leverage problem is a long run phenomenon. 
As a result, the use of long term debt ratio is appropriate 
in this study. 
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The measurement of the debt ratio - (D): 
- the debt ratio for each firm for every year is defined 
as: 
Di = (L.debt)/(T.Asset) 
- D is the mean of debt ratio evaluated at the book value 
from 1986-1990 for each firm. ie., 
D = ~Di/n where n=5 is the number of year. 
2) Size - we use the natural logarithm of total asset. 
The reason for taking logarithm is that the value of the 
asset size is too large in comparison with the debt ratio 
which lies between zero and one, as a result, the parameter 
estimated will be trivial. Perhaps, the result of taking 
logarithm will alter the equation functional form. 
The sign of this variable on the debt ratio lS 
supposed to be positive because a large firm lS more 
diversified and therefore is less prone to bankruptcy. 
The measurement of size (S): 
- the size of each firm for every year is defined as the 
natural log of the total asset: 
Si = log(T.asset} 
- S is the mean size of each firm from 1986-1990: 
3) 
S = ~S,/n 1 
Growth rate the growth rate is defined as the 
current year total asset minus previous year total asset 
divided by the previous year total asset. As a result, the 
data of 1986 is taken as a missing value. Therefore, we 
only have four values which are used in calculating 
56 
mean growth rate for each firm. 
Theoretically, higher growth rate will demand more debts 
for financing and therefore has a positive sign. 
The measurement of growth rate (G): 
growth rate for each firm for every year is defined as 
the current year total asset minus previous year total 
asset divided by the previous year total asset. In view 
of this, we don't have 1986 growth rate and take its as 
a missing value. 
Gi = (T.asset)i - (T.asset)i_l]/(T.asset)i_l 
- G is the average growth rate for each firm from 1986-1990 
G=L:G· /n 1 
4) Collateral asset/Asset type - more collateral asset 
may be expected to issue more debt. From Scott's argument, 
it is always optimal to increase debt as long as the debt 
is fully secured. If the asset is collateral, the debt 
issued upon those collateral assets can be regarded as 
secured. 
The measurement of asset type/collaterality (C): 
- asset type of each firm for every year is defined as 
C· = (inventories + net fixed assets + other fixed 1 
assets + development properties + investment 
properties)/Total asset. 
- C is the mean of measurement of collaterality of ~ach 
firm from 1986-1990. 
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5) Earning risk A firm wi th a high earnings ra te 
variability, would have a relatively lower debt ratio 
because it is more easily subject to bankruptcy risks. 
The measurement of earning risk (V): 
earning risk E is the coefficient of variation in income 
from operations of each firm. The coefficient of 
variation were calculated with data from 1986-1990. The 
reason for dividing by the mean value is to decouple 
volatility from the sheer effects of size. 
E = 0 (ope'ra t:ingincome) III (opera ting income) for each 
firm. 
6) Non-debt shields - according to DeAngelo and Masulis, 
debt ratio is negatively related to those non-debt tax 
shields like depreciation and tax credit. If there exists 
a large amount of debt, less will be left for the 
shareholders which can enjoy the tax deductibility of 
nondebt shields. 
The measurement of non-debt tax shield (D): 
- Since our data set lacks the item of depreciation, we use 
the average depreciation rate in Hong Kong.,ie 15% and 
multiplied by the fixed asset. By the same reasoning, 
divided by total asset is to avoid scale effect. 
Therefore, the measurement of non-debt tax shield for 
each firm for every year is defined as: 
D. = 15%*(fixed asset)/Total asset. 
1 
- D is the average of the depreciation of each firm from 
the year of 1986-1990. 
D=l:D· In I 
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7) Earning rate - It is normally predicted that when a 
firm has high earning rate, it will have lower debt ratio 
because higher earning rate can generate more internal 
funds which does not need debt financing. 
The measurement of earning rate/profitability (E): 
- earning rate for each firm for every year is defined as 
the income from operating divided by the total asset. 
Ei = (Income from operating)/(t.asset) 
- E is the mean of earning rate for each firm from 1986-
1990. 
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D) The results 
D.l) The regression. 
By the above definitions, the regression for testing 
the cross-section data of the capi tal structure in Hong 
Kong . is: 
I I 
I Source I 
I ! Model 
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The equation is: 
D = - 0.115713 + 0.012331*10gS + 0.071706*C 
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Table 6 
Correlation of Estimates 
S A D I V 
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1) A small value of Adj R2 (0.2326) is not surprising. 
Many corresponding studies in the journals also show around 
[ 8] . As mentioned in the introduction, this 
kind of model suffers from the low explanatory power, i.e. 
low R2. It is this drawback that leads to the rise of other 
theories. _~Y ' the same token, it is the reason for us to 
conduct another empirical study so that we can facilitate 
our understanding of the capital structure problem in Hong 
Kong. However, since the static tradeoff model is 
classical in this literature, it is better to tackle the 
problem first by this approach. 
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2) The equation F-value Pr > F = 0.0001 shows that it is 
nearly impossible to have all estimated coefficients to be 
equal to zero. 
3) Individual variables: 
i) Size - its sign is correct and lS significant at 0.01% 
level. 
ii) Asset type - its sign is correct and is significant at 
0.05% level too. 
iii) Growth - its sign is correct and is significant at 
20 .. 41% level. 
iv) Depreciation - its sign is correct but nearly 
totally insignificant. 
v) Business risk - its sign is incorrect but significant 
at 4.9% level. However, the parameter estimated of 
the volatility is so small that its effect on the debt 
ratio can be ignored. 
vi) Earning rate - its sign is correct and significant at 
O.01?6 level. 
" The Adj Rt. =0.2326 means that the regression can 
explain 23.26% of the capital structure nature in Hong 
Kong. Although the model can only account for 23.26% of 
the problem, parameters estimated are quite satisfactory. 
In other words, the model is quite successful in explaining 
23.26% of the debt ratios in Hong Kong. 
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D.3) A check on multicollinearity. 
Not surprisingly, multicollinearity may appear as a 
major problem to our model because growth, earning rate, 
size themselves can maintain certain relationship. The 
existence of multicollinearity affects the unbiasedness of 
our estimates. In view of this, it is necessary to check 
wherever multicollinearity lS serious in our model. 
At this stage, we use two instruments to check 
multicollinearity problem: 
a) A look on correlation coefficients. 
The table of correlation coefficients are printed 
above. By looking at it, we find that. the correlation 
coefficients are not greatly different from zero. Perhaps, 
the greatest correlation coefficient value is that of 
depreciation and asset type (-0.5583). At the first 
glance, it is strange to obtain this paradoxical resul t 
because by the measurement of asset type, we use 
(inventories + net fixed assets + other fixed assets + 
development properties + investment properties)/Total 
asset; whereas the measurement of depreciation is (15%*net 
fixed asset) /total asset. As a resul t f two i terns are 
expected to move in the same direction. When we have more 
collateral assets, we expect more assets for depreciation. 
However, our result shows the opposite way. This is mainly 
due to our adoption of measurement of two variables. For 
the measurement of asset type, we include not only net 
fixed assets(which is used for calculating depreciation) 
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but also other assets types. It does not imply a necessary 
casual relations between two variables because the 
measurement of depreciation is only one small component of 
the collateral assets. Moreover, different firms face 
different assets component. Therefore, strong negati ve 
relation is strange but not unreasonable. 
b) A look on variance inflation factor. 
For the ith coefficient, the variance inflation factor 
is defined as 1/ (1-R i
2), where Ri2 is the coeffici.ent of 
determination of the regression of the ith independent 
variable on all other independent variables. It can be 
shown that the variance of the estimate of that coefficient 
is larger by that factor than it would be if the 
independent variables were uncorrelated. The table of 
variance inflation factor of our model is as follow: 
Table 7 
Variance inflation factor 
VARIABLES: VARIANCE INFLATION FACTOR 
I INTERCEPT 0 , I 
i 
SIZE 1. 01306224 I 
ASSET TYPE 1.47038279 
DEPRECIATION _- 1.48398855 
EARNING RISK 1.00537667 ! 
GROWTH RATE 1.01337473 
EARNING RATE 1.03739587 
It is shown that the variance inflation factors are 
all close to 1. Multicollinearity is actually the 
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interrelationship between independent variables. As 
mentioned above, variance inflation factor is defined as 
1/ (1-R i2), where Ri 2 is the coefficient of determination of 
the regression of the ith independent variable on all other 
I) 
independent variables. If Ri'~' approaches zero, this implies 
variance inflation factor for the i variable is close to 1. 
In fact, Ri2 is the measure of the effects of other 
independent variables on i variable. The closes it lS to 
I, the less the effects of other variables on it. 
The check on correlation coefficient tells us that 
depreciation and asset type has -0.5583 negative 
correlation coefficient. However, by looking at variance 
inflation factor of depreciation and asset type 
respectively, we see that their values are close to one. 
To concl ude , by the examina tion of the correla tion 
coefficient matrix and variance inflation factor, we can 
say that the multicollinearity is not a problem to our 
equation. 
D.4) Heteroscedasticity 
The problem of heteroscedasticity will be handled by 
two tests: 
a) Breusch-Pagan test 
The Breusch-Pagan test first requires us to "guess" 
variables that are suspected to lead to heteroscedasticity 
method. Here, we use size to fulfil this purpose. When a 
firm with larger size, the debt ratio may show a larger 
fluctuation around the regression line because when a firm 
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is larger, although it can bear more debts, it will have 
more flexibility in choosing financing methods other than 
debts like equity finance or more internal funds. As firms 
are larger, in spite of rising debt ratio, there will be 
more fluctuation around the regression line and results in 
more variance. This is the nature of heteroscedasticity 
problem. 
The Breusch-Pagan statistic ' is 11.717685 with 1 
degree of freedom. Under the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity at the 1 percent level of significance is 
6.635. As a result, we may suspect that in our model 
heteroscedasticity may exist. However, the Breusch-Pagan 
test has been shown to be sensitive to any violation of the 
normality assumption. 
handle the problem. 
b ) Wh i t e 's t est . 
We can search for other test to 
It is a direct test for heteroscedasticity that is 
very closely related to the Breusch-Pagan test but does not 
assume any prior knowledge of the heteroscedastici ty as 
well as normality assumption. 
The statistic is 45.2299 with chi-square distribution 
and the degree of freedom is 26. We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of homoscedastici ty at 1% significant level 
(45.6417) .. 
In conclusion, our model may, according to the 
'Breusch-Pagan, this may involve heteroscedastici ty problem. 
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But from the Whi te' s test, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis at l Q~ ~o significant level. Therefore, in our 
model, it is reasonable to guess that the 
heteroscedastici ty problem exists, but it may not be a 
serious and is bearable. 
Perhaps, the most serious problem of this kind of 
model is not heteroscedasticity but low explanatory power. 
The low explained sum of squares is due to the fact that 
there are too many considerations that enter into the 
financing decision but cannot be modelled. Perhaps, the 
most important contribution is that within what the model 
can explain, most of the parameters estimated are 
statistically significant. 
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11) Testing the difference in the industries debt ratios 
A) Aims 
It is normally predicted that capital structure must 
show significant difference across industries because 
different industries have various kinds of business risks 
which are directly related to bankruptcy costs. For 
instance, hotel industry is subject to cyclical demands, 
properties are affected by fundamental economic strength, 
interest rate and political atmosphere, consolidated 
industry are well diversified and are 
business cycle etc. Actually, different 
also capture the source of bankruptcy. 
grouped under the static tradeoff model. 
less prone to 
business risks 
Hence i t can be 
In this section we try to examine whether this claim 
can sustain. The separation of this part with the previous 
section is that their foci are different: one is on the 
firm characteristic while another is pn the industry level. 
B) Data and Methodologv 
1) We do not use financial industry data for analysis 
because financial intermediaries are acting as the channel 
of funds from surplus units to deficit units. As a result, 
it must have high debt ratio. 
2) The mean debt ratio for every firm in the sample is 
calculated from 1980-1991. 
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3) Here we do not only utilize long term debt ratio. 
Other ratios like total debt ratio and short term debt 
ratio are used too because the main purpose of this section 
is only to test the difference of debt ratio. 
3) There are 321 observations in the sample. 
4) The statistical method for testing difference in 
industry leverage is ANOVA 12 . The classification lS 
according to how PACAP categorizes and finance industry is 
eliminated. The results are as follows: 
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Table 8 
Anova result for the debt ratio: (1980-1991) 
Total debt ratio. 
DF SUM OF SQUARES MEAN SQUARE I ? VALUE 
5 I 1.04824609 I 0.20964922 I 9.37 
316 I 7.07217871 I 0.02238031 1 
PR > F 0.0001 
Table 9 
Anova result for the debt ratio: (1980-1991) 
Long term debt ratio. 
I I I MEAN SQUARE I ! DF I SUM OF' SQUARES I F VALUE I 
i 
I 0.20840719 0.04168144 
I 5,92 I 5 i 
1 
316 I 2.22460605 I 0.00703989 1 






12 The ANOVA procedure is designed to handle balanced 
data{that is, data with equal numbers of ~bserv~tions) whe~eas 
GLM is used to handle unbalanced data. Slnce In o~r studles, 











Anova result for the debt ratio: (1980-1991) 
Short term debt ratio J . 
SOURCE I I 
11 
DF SUM OF SQUARES MEAN SQUARE F VALUE I 
MODEL 5 1.15427648 0.23085530 I 16.32 
ERROR 316 1 4.47121625 0.01414942 I 
1 I 
PR > F 0.0001 
The resul t IS consistent wi th our prediction. The 
significant p-value (0.0001) implies that there is only 
0.01% of wrong rejection of null hypothesis that -all mean 
leverage ratios across industries are simultaneously equal 
to zero. Or t interpreted in another way, there is more 
variation in mean leverage ratios across industries than 
within industries. 
Ill) Summary-
To conclude the results of the part I empirical study, 
there are two points worth mentioning. 
1) In Hong Kong I most firms are of small size13 . The 
difficulty of obtaining funds from interest-bearing 
securities makes them resort to bank loans. 
However, the main difference between interest-bearing 
securities and bank loans is that normally interest-bearing 
securi ties are unsecured or wi thout mortgage. On the 
contrary, the request for bank loans in the event of large 
13 In Nov, 1992, the biggest twenty leading companies 
occupied 65.31% of the total market capitalization. - sources: 
Securities Journal Jan, 1993. 
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amount may require security or property as mortgage. Each 
bank will value each forthcoming customers and set a credit 
line for him. If the company is credible or have sound 
financial si tuations, up to certain amount, it does not 
request securities or properties for mortgage. But this 
may not be true for large amount of borrowing. 
In Hong Kong, therefore, the credit rationing set the 
upper limit of debt ratio of a firm, ie , debt ratio of a 
firmi < credit line set by banks. Since the amount of the 
credit limit prevents a firm from pursuing a high debt 
financing policy. In consequence, Hong Kong debt ratio is 
relatively low (overall < 30%) in comparison to the United 
States, Japan or other countries like Germany. 
For the static tradeoff model, we would like to know 
different determinants that affect a firm's debt ratio in 
Hong Kong. It is reasonable to guess that those group of 
determinants also affect other countries' debt ratio. 
Moreover f other countries' banks also have credit limit 
policy. However, one crucial difference is that other 
countries' firms have good access to capital market while 
Hong Kong's companies do not. 
Therefore, the first part empirical studies is 
equi valent to examine the signs of various determinants 
affecting a firm's debt ratio in Hong Kong which is under 
the si tua tion of lacking sound capi tal market. On the 
other hand, corresponding studies in the foreign countries 
can be expressed in the following way that examines the 
signs of various determinants that affecting a firm's debt 
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ratio under the situation of the presence of bank loans and 
capital market. 
By our study, the result is consistent with the 
corresponding studies using foreign data. This implies 
that although the constraint is different, the results are 
similar. Moreover, qui te unfortunately, it suffers the 
') 
same low R" fate. As a result, we need more to explain 
capital structure problem in Hong Kong. 
2) For the industry influence, we find that different 
industries d9. exhibi ~ ._ distinct pattern of debt ratios. 
This coincide with what the theory predicts. 
Perhaps, lD order to deepen our understanding of the 
leverage ratio in Hong Kong, we go to the part TT empirical 
study - announcement effect. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EMPIRICAL RESULT: PART 11 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the traditional 
static tradeoff model has low explanatory power. In the 
part 1 empirical result, it is shown that Hong Kong 
situation is consistent with what the static - model 
predicts. However, it is also subject to the fate of 
• 'l 
unsatlsfactory R6. It gives us a motive to conduct part 11 
empirical research in the hope of getting a more clear 
picture of Hong Kong capital structure problem. This part 
research lays emphasis on the announcement effect which is 
a derived testable hypothesis under the asymmetric 
information model. 
When a firm announces the issue of equity, it provides 
a signal such that the firm is not in a good state. Or, in 
other words, ~hen a fjTm annou~ces . new share issue, the 
market knows that the true value of the firm is less than 
market valuation and the market will promptly reflect in 
the drop o~ _ the share price. The details of the model can 
be referred to the theory literature review in chapter 
one. If announcement effect exists in Hong Kong, it can 
account for why firms in Hong Kong are reluctant to issue 
new shares except - under some condi tions . The relation 
between announcement effect and Hong Kong observation will 
be discussed following the empirical result. 
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I) The empirical study 
A) The data 
1) All the data of this study comes from the dataset 
named "PACAP" which is installed i.n the Computer Centre of 
the Chinese University of Hong Kong under the supervision 
of the Business Administration faculty. 
2) This study covers 75 times right issues 14 of listed 
firms in the Stock Exchange from 1984 to 1990 in the 
"PACAp lI • This does not include the data when the firms 
apply for listing. Noreover, the dataset from the "PACAp lI 
may not totally cover all the right issues wi thin this 
period. We can therefore view 75 times as a sample of 
right issue from 1984 to 1990. 
3 ) The offering was for common stock only. Joint 
offerings of common stock and any other financing 
instruments (like warrant) are included. It is because the 
incorporation of other financing instruments will distort 
the pricing behavio~r so that we cannot clearly separate 
whether the · announcement effect are due to new shares or 
other financing instruments. 
4) Unlike other corresponding studies, we include 
financial sectors. The main reason for this inclusion is: 
Although financial sector is endowed with high debt 
ratio, the main purpose of this part is to test whether 
stock prices drop once firms decide to· announce equi ty 
14 Within 75 times of right issues, some of them are taken 
by the same firms more than once. 
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issue. High debt ratios cannot avoid this announcement 
effect because investors regard new equity issue as a bad 
news even if the firm has high level of debt ratios or not 
(unlike the previous part that test the determinants of 
debt ratios in which debt ratios itself is the main 
concern. A sector wi th inherently high debt ratio will 
distort the result) . 
5) Finally, the date of announcement was from the "PACAP" 
too. 
B) Types of data needed. 
1) Daily equally weighted market returns wi thout cash 
dividends reinvested. 
The exclusion of cash dividend avoid the disturbance 
effect of cash dividend on returns. The file represents 
daily returns excluding cash dividends for an equally 
weighted market portfolio. All common and preferred stocks 
with non-missing returns and non-missing market values for 
the previous month are included in the calculation. 
2) Daily returns of each sample stock without cash 
dividends reinvested. It is calculated as follows: 
= CLSPRC(t) *AMOUNT(d) *[l+AMOUNT(s)+AMOUNT(r)] - 1 
CLSPRC(t-l)+[SUBPRC*AMOUNT(r)*AMOUNT(d)] 
where CLSPRC(t) = closing price at day t, 
CLSPRC(t-l) = closing price at day t-l, 
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AMOUNT (d) = no. of shares that one original share 
becomes on DTEXDI =t, 
AMOUNT(s) = allocation rate for stock dividends 
with DTEXDI = t, 
AMOUNT(r} = allocation rate for rights offering 
with DTEXDI = t, 
SUBPRC = subscription price for rights 
offering, 
DTEXDI = ex-distribution date .15 
C) Methodology. 
C.1) Event day approach. 
The concept of event day is different from calendar 
day. It is the backbone of our study. Perhaps, using an 
example can better illustrate the 'event day' more clearly. 
Everyone has a birthday, but everyone birthday falls 
on different calendar day. 
Now, suppose John's birthday is 1-4-1980, Mary's 
birthday is 2-2-1963, Peter's birthday is 9-12-1967. In 
this case, birthday is an 'event day' but it falls on 
different c~l_endar day for different people. 
First, we let "birthday" as event day O. Therefore, 
event day 0 for John is 1-4-1980, for Mary is 2-2-1963, for 
Peter is 9-12-1967. By -the same reasoning, a day before 
event day 0 is known as event day -1, therefore, event day 
15 It represents the data on which the stock is first traded 
without the right to receive the capital distribution. 
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-1 for John lS 31-3-1980, for Mary is 1-2-1963, for Peter 
is 8-12-1967_ Not surprisingly, event day +1 is a day 
after event day 0 when for John is 2-4-1980, for Mary is 3-
2-1963, for Peter is 10-12-1967. Using the same technique, 
we can construct an event day table as follows: 
Name 
Event day 
Event day -3 
Event day -2 
Event day -1 
Evenc day 0 (birthday) 
2vent day +1 
EVent day +2 












30-1 -1963 5-12 -1957 
31-1-1963 7-12-1957 
1-2-1963 8-12-1967 




As seen from the table, the same event day for 
different persons are corresponding to different dates on 
calendar. 
The importance of the use of event day is that: we 
want to know whether they have common happening in the 
event day_ Using the previous example, suppose we want to 
know (test) whether people will collect gifts in the 
birthday, then 1-4-1980, 2-2-1963, 9-12-1967 three days 
share a common characteristic: they are the birthdays for 
John, Mary and Peter respectively even they born on 
different dates on calendar. Therefore f event day 0 
actually represents different calendar dates for the same 
event (birthday) . 
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Event day concept is important because it can collect 
different observations that share a common characteristics. 
C.l.1) With reference to our empirical studies, event 
day is announcement day for different firms. Therefore, 
event day 0 is the day of collection of different firms 
announcing equity issue. 
Apart from this, slnce we want to test the 
announcement effect of the equity issue, the period that we 
use to measure announcement effect is referred to 
announcement period. The announcement period is defined to 
include the announcement day and its following trading day. 
The cause of it is that the time of releasing news of right 
lssue on announcement day may be so late that the market 
may have already closed. As a result, its effect will be 
shown on the following trading day. 
C.2) Portfolio approach. 
C.2.1) In our study, there are two portfolios. One is 
the market portfolio which gives us daily equally weighted 
market returns without cash dividends reinvested. 
C.2.2) The other is the portfolio of those stocks which 
had right issues (which we denote announced portfolio 
throughout the thesis). 
The needs of a market portfolio is that the market 
portfolio stands for the portfolio that does not have 
announcement effect whilst the announced portfolio 
represen ts the portf 01 io wi th announcemen t ef feet. The 
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ca use 0 f why wee an 11\ a k e sue 11 cLi re c t~ co III par i so ni. s t 11 (l t 
both portfolios are well diversified enough so that their 
risk nature is similar. (Both portfoli.o' ~> unsystematic 
risks are well diversified enough and only systematic risks 
\-.J 11 i ch are re 1. ate d t. 0 the 9 en era lee 0 nom i c ,~~ n v j . r 0 n III en t 
remains) In other words, those risks that con be 
diversified are taken away because both portfolios have 
large number of firms. Therefore, the return to the market 
portfolio represen ts compensa tion to those r1 ~3ks \-1h ich 
cannot be diversified while the return to t.he announced 
portfolio represents compensation to those risks that 
cannot be diversified and clue to announcement (~ffect. 
By comparison of two portfolio, we can discover the 
returns due to announcement effects. 
C.3) The steps of how we can use the two portfolios for 
comparison with utilization of event day method. The steps 
can be shown by an example: 
1) Suppose the economy h.as totally 10 stocks standing for 
10 firms respectively. We denote them by S' 1 
i=1,2, ... ,10 where Si represents stock i or firm i. 
where 
Now, 
let the first three firms SI' 82 and 83 have right issues. 
The dates of announcement are 3-3-1984, 6-6-1987 and 9-9-
1990 corresponding to stocks 1,2,3. As a result, grouping 
firms 1,2,3 together is our announced portfolio. 
2) In addition, since each stock itself has its own rate 
of return on corresponding announcement day, for instance, 
firm 1 rate of return on 3-3-1984 is 1%, firm 2 rate of 
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return on 6-6-1987 is 3% and firm 3 rate of return on 9-9-
Then on the average, the rate of return for 
the announced portfolio on announcement day is (1+3+4)/3 = 
2.67%. As in our studies, announcement period includes the 
announcement day and its following trading day, we can get 
the announced portfolio ra te of return on the following 
trading day can be gathered by the same method, says 3%. 
Then the total announcement effect is simply the sum of two 
days' rate of returns. ,i.e. 5.67%. Not surprisingly, we 
can utilize the same technique for event day -1, -2, -3 ... 
or +2, +3 +4 ... (because +1 is used in the calculation of 
announcement). Finally, we can obtain a series of rates of 
return of the announced portfolio on each event day. 
3) After understanding the method of calculating the 
rates of return of the announced portfolio, it is 
straightforward to understand the market portfolio's rates 
of return. The market portfolio is simply the equally 
weighted rate of returns of our 10 firms in our example. 
In our studies, the market portfol,io's rates of return 
\ 
include all stocks with non-missing r :eturns. Therefore, on 
3-3-1984, the market portfolio's return, says 4%, on 6-6-
1987, it is 5%, on 9-9-1990, it is 6%. Then on announcement 
day, the average market portfolio's rate of returns is 5%. 
In consequence, by repea ting the same reasoning, we can 
calculate the average market portfolio's rate of returns 
for each event day. 
Since two-portfolios approach is very crucial to test 
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the announcement effect, we set artificial figures to 
further illustrate it. Plea f t t bl 12 . se re er .0 ~a e _ . 
R. R (%) 
Event days 
Day t = -2 
Day t = -1 
Day t = 0 
Ann. day 
Day t = +1 
Day t = +2 
Day t = +3 
Table 12 
An example 
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As can be seen from the above table, the term firmi R.R 
is the firmi rate of return on the event day. The term 
market R.R is the market rate of return on the same event 
day_ The bracket is the calendar date corresponding to the 
event day. Th~· teim 'ann.port' is ~he rate of return of 
the announced portfolio on the event day t_ The term 
'market avg.' is the average return of the market portfolio 
(which itself is the equally weighted market returns 
without cash dividends reinvested) on the event t. By 
repeating this process, we can obtain a series of the rates 
of returns of announced portfolio and market portfolio 
respectively. 
The most important underlying point behind two 
portfolios is that the market portfolio is not supposed to 
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be affected by announcement effect. The only difference 
between the two portfolio is that the announced portfolio 
has announcement effect while the market portfolio has not. 
Therefore, the difference of the rate of return is the 
result due to announcement effect. 
D) Resul ts 
D.1) Announcement effect. 
The announcement effect can be best seen by the 
following table. The table 13 outlines ten event days 































Pattern of rate of return 10 
event days before and after 
announcement period 
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The second column is the market portfolio returns on 
event days. 
The third column is the announced portfolio returns on 
event days. 
The fourth column is the difference of returns between 
ann 0 un c e d !3 t 0 (~k po r t f 01 i 0 and m ark e t po r t f 01 i 0 . ( the 
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returns of announced portfolio minus the returns of the 
market portfolio). 
Perhaps, it is better to review the reason why we can 
directly make comparison between two portfolios is that 
both portfolios are diversified enough so that their risk 
nature is very similar. It is because, according to the 
finance theory, unsystematic risk which is supposingly 
peculiar to a firm can be got rid of by enough 
diversification. For the announced portfolio, it contains 
75 times of right issues which include over 60 firms from 
various industries. Therefore, the announced portfolio is 
diversified enough and all unsystematic risks can be 
eliminated. For the market portfolio, it includes all the 
stocks in Hong Kong economy, of course all unsys tema tic 
risks are also got rid of. By this simple reasoning, both 
portfolios face the same systematic risks which cannot be 
taken away by diversification. In brief, systematic risks 
are those risks related to the performance of economy_ . 
Therefore, " we have two portfofios ,faci.ng the same risk 
nature (systematic risks which are same to both 
portfolios). In our case, the difference in the rates of 
return can_~e attributed to the announcement effect because 
what is the difference between two similar portfolios is 
that announced portfolio has right issue while another is 
not infl uenced by it. Therefore, we can directly regard 
the difference of two portfolios' returns as the effect due 
to announcement effect. 
In addi tion to the table, the announcement effect 
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around announcement period can be best seen by d figure 2 . 
From this figure, there are three special features: 
a) Obviously, there is a distinct drop at days of 
announcement period., ie 5.7%. which is quite tremendous. 
This is consistent with what pecking order theory predicts: 
the investors regard the right issue as a bad news of the 
companies and therefore correct their previous pricj.ng. 
This can explain why firms do not always issue stocks in 
Hong Kong. 
b) Most of the events days' net returns before the 
announcement period shows negative sign which, to a certain 
extent, means that the market "guesses" the information of 
the right issue, or there may exist insider trading. 
Although this phenomenon cannot be proved or refuted, the 
peculiar pattern may worth attention because it is not a 
firm's particular pattern. It is a pattern of an average 
of 75 times right issue during 1984-1990. 
c) Perhaps, the reaction of the market to the news of 
equity issue is drastic only at the announcement period. 
This means that the market response is once and for all 
rather than continuously. It is because if the market 
response is in a continuous way, there will be a gradual 













































































































11) The relation between the empirical resul t and Hong 
Kong observation. 
There are many interesting features that are important 
in our further understanding of the capital structure 
problem in Hong Kong. 
A) Equity-finance phenomenon. 
When a firm faces financing decision, there are two 
alternatives available: debt financing or equity financing. 
In fact, there are many interesting phenomenon related to 
equity financing behaviour in Hong Kong. 
A.l) We examine right offerings around 1984 to 1990, so 
far as the information I obtain, I find that there are five 
interesting properties: 
a) When a firm conducts right issue, the amount involved 
normally accounts for a significant portion of the firm's 
size. See the table 14: 
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Table 14 
The amount of equity issue 
expressed in ratio to 
the total asset of 
the year of issue (R) 
Amount expressed in ra tio to the total 
asset (R) 
R ( 0.1 
0.1 $ R < 0.2 
0.2 ~ R ( 0.3 
0.3 ~ R ( o . 4 
0.4 ~ R ( 0.5 
R ? 0;5 












It is easily seen that when a firm issues equity, the 
amount involved is quite large. In fact, the huge amount 
is closely related to which kinds of projects are to be 
financed. This comes to our second observation. 
b) The funds raised from equity financing are mainly for 
few kinds of purposes: for acquiring assets, for the 
acquisi tions of, other · firms I share;s, for lowering debt 
ratio. Surprisingly, for my available records of the use 
of funds, over half is for the acquisi tion by means of 
buying assets (like buildings, godowns) or by acquiring 
shares of other firms. 
c) In the year of equity issue, we find that, on the 
average, the debt ra tio is rela ti vely high (0.282353) in 
comparison to the previous year and the year after issue 
(0.23599 and 0.211652 respectively). The high debt ratio 
at the year of equity issue gives us an interesting 
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property financing behaviour which will be discussed later. 
d) The cash or securities which is highly liquid is known 
slack16 is not low (0.285314). Since according to the 
pecking order theory (please refer to the theory review), 
firms will not resort to equity finance except after they 
have already exhausted slack (therefore low level of slack) 
and debt capacity (therefore high debt ratio). 
e) The time of equity issue is usually at the level of 
high stock price. _ 
For instance, in 1987, there are 17 times of right 
issue before the stock crash in October. After October, no 
firm in Hong Kong conducted right issue. When the market 
started to recover in middle 1988 and continue before June 
1989, there are 27 times of right issue. This means that 
firms try to choose time to issue new shares when the stock 
market is booming. 
The above five features together can glve us a better 
understanding of corporate financing behaviour which is now 
discussed. 
8.2) Why and uses equity finance? 
The above features ca.n give us a broad idea of the 
nature of Hong Kong firms' equity financing decision. 
Normally, Hong Kong firms issue new equity in order to buy 
other firms, acquisitions of assets (like buildings) or for 
long terms investment. Normally, the amounts involved can 
16 Slack includes cash, marketable securities, account and 
account receivable. 
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immediately double the firms' size. 
use debt financing. 
It is impossible to 
On the other hand, by the pecking order theory, a firm 
will first use slack for financing investment, later by 
debt lssue and equi ty in the end. (Please see the 
literature review). This implies that if a firm issues 
equity, it should have first exhausted its slack and debt 
capaci ty. This will gi ve up a low slack level but high 
debt ratio. Nevertheless, our records show that we have 
both high slack level and debt ratio. Why? 
In fact, in our daily life, slack cannot be too low 
because they are used for operating expense, paying wages, 
repaying debts etc. Moreover, since a large part of loans 
in Hong Kong is In the form of short-term loans which are 
usually matured within a year. Thence, it is necessary to 
have certain amount of slack for the payment of debts. 
This can account for why slack cannot be too low when the 
firms issue equity. 
On the other hand, the high debt ratio is consistent 
with what pecking order theory predicts. If the debt ratio 
is high and if we still use debt financing, this will make 
the debt ratio even higher. For instance, if the original 
debt level is 30% of the total liabilities, now we want to 
raise funds for acquisition and the amount is another 30% 
(sometimes even double the original firm size) of the 
balance sheet. Apart from this, for acquisi tion or for 
takeover the money must be paid once and for all. The debt 
ratio will immediately rise to 60% of the total assets. 
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This generates two serious problems: 
1) Sometimes, it may be impossible to obtain loans 
from the financing sectors due to credit rationing because 
we have already had high debt ratio. Even the debt ratio 
is not high, the large amount of investment may make the 
debt ratio jump to an unaffordable high level and still 
cannot obtain funds from banks because of credit rationing; 
2) As mentioned above, the 'money' IS usually for 
acquisition which is grouped into long term assets. Then 
it will create a unhealthy situation: On the liability 
side, if the money is from debt financing method (no matter 
from long term or from short term), since for acquisition, 
the amount paid out is once and for all, the debt ratio 
will rise discretely rather than continuously. However, we 
have to pay interest and even principal occasionally. 
On the asset side, the assets acquired is long term 
fixed assets which is not liquid (even if it can provide 
stream of income, it may not be obtained promptly, or the 
income stream is unstable). The lack of liquidity and the 
bearing of high level of debts is undesirable for the 
firms. 
For the high debt ratio at the year of equity issue 
(this is consistent with pecking order theory) I the above 
points will hint at two problems: 
1) High debt ratio hints at further bank loans financing 
difficult; 
2) Even the firm can obtain further bank loans (perhaps 
the original debt ratio is low), the discrete rise of debt 
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ratios will make the firms subject to bankruptcy. 
One point worthies mentioning is that, according to 
the pecking order theory, high debt ratio is a necessary 
condi tion for equi ty financing because firms must first 
exhaust their debt capacity. In Hong Kong case, we also on 
the average observe high debt ratio before equity 
financing. This is consistent with the pecking order 
theory. Moreover, as mentioned in the chapter 3, Hong Kong 
is featured with lo~ debt capacity because the only source 
of debt is from the bank loans which set credit limit for 
the firms acting as a upper bound. 
This may account for why firms need equity financing 
in such investments (large amount, fixed assets, pay the 
bills within a short period). 
C.3) The timing of equity finance. 
However, it is meaningful to ask an question: These 
investment opportunities always exist, for instance, if my _ 
target of acquisition is a building, . the building will not 
vanish throughout time. Moreover, a firm's debt ratio need 
not only be high at the time of equity issue, it may be 
high in 19~5 or in 1989. But if we only observe in 1989 
the firm issue equity tb buy the assets. Then why didn't 
this firm buy the asset in 1985 when the debt ratio was 
also high and the building also existed? 
Clearly, there must be other considerations beside 
high debt ratio. It is because for the same objecti ve 
phenomenon (same investment opportunity and high debt 
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ratio) I we have equity issue at one time and without equity 
issue at another time. Why? 
The answer lies in the fact that when a firm decides 
to issue equity, the firm's stock price will drop. This is 
known as announcement effect. The reason for this can be 
referred to the theoretical review. The presence of 
announcement effect make the firms issue equity only when 
the stock price is high so that it can minimize the adverse 
effect of the price drop. Of course, it is reasonable to 
say that there must be other factors that deny the 
decisions to issue equity like avoiding dilution of 
corporate control, underwri ting si tua tion etc. However, 
upto now, announcement effect is the most well-founded and 
empirically testable. Other elements are either difficult 
to be modelled or tested empirically. We do not say that 
announcement effect is the sole factor that deter equity 
issue decision, but in economics, we don't have other 
alternatives that can be empirically treated 
satisfactorily .. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
The pathbreaking M-M theorem, perhaps, is one of the 
most important theorem in the modern finance theory. It 
paves the way for subsequent theorists to rethink the 
problem of capital structure. Many schools arise to supply 
answers to the problem of capjtal _structure. The first one 
is static tradeoff school. 
The static tradeoff model implies that there is 
normally an optimal debt ratio as a result of the balance 
between costs and benefi ts of using debt. The benefit 
refers to the tax deductibili ty of interest payments on 
debt while the costs are the bankruptcy costs. However, it 
is impossible to solve for an optimal debt ratio because it 
is unlikely that the above idea can be easily expressed in 
an explicit equation. In view of this, the main direction 
of the empirical study pf the traditional tradeoff model is 
to test the signs of various determinants on the debt ratio 
and usually cross-section method is adopted. 
The first part empirical study of this thesis goes 
along with this tradition. It is shown that the result is 
quite consistent with what the static tradeoff model says. 
However, unfortunately, it suffers the same main setback 
faced by similar studies using foreign data, i. e. a low 
explanatory power or the regression has low R2. 
It is this defect that gives rise to other 
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interpretations of the capital structure problem. They are 
the agency costs model and the asymmetric information 
model. 
On the one hand, agency costs models put emphasis on 
the principle-agent problem. For instance there are 
conflicts of interest between the manager and the 
shareholders or between the shareholders and debtholders. 
On the other hand, the asymmetric information approach says 
that the distribution of information is uneven between the 
market and the management of the firm. An implication of 
the model is that firms are reluctant to use equity as a 
means of financing. 
Among the testable hypotheses from both approaches, 
the most important empirical hypothesis is the announcement 
effect which has been tested in chapter four. In short, 
announcement effect means that when a firm announces new 
shares issue, the stock price will drop because of the bad 
signalling. The empirical results show that the 
announcement effect does exist in Hong Kong. The statistic 
shows that there is a 5.7% drop in the rate of return on 
the announcement period which includes the announcement day 
and its fol~owing trading day. 







phenomenon. Coupled wi th specific 
low debt ratio) of Hong Kong, the 
presence of announcement effect can account for why firms 
in Hong Kong are reluctant to finance by equi ty except 
under certain conditions, such as the need for huge amount 
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